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Is More Antitrust
the Answer to
Wealth Inequality?

W

Market power often serves progressive aims.
✒ By Daniel A. Crane

ealth inequality has reemerged
as a major political issue and may
become one of the defining themes
of the 2016 presidential election.
Progressives claim a broad set of
causes for wealth inequality, from
tax loopholes favoring the wealthy
to the decline of private sector unionization.
Recently, a number of high-profile public intellectuals have
begun to finger an additional culprit—lax antitrust enforcement.
According to prominent progressives such as Nobel economics laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, former labor
secretary Robert Reich, and Oxford economist Anthony Atkinson, weak enforcement of the antitrust laws has permitted the
flourishing of anticompetitive mergers, monopolistic conduct,
and other exclusionary and collusive behavior, with the effect
of redistributing wealth upward to corporate shareholders and
senior executives and away from the less wealthy strata of society.
This monopoly regressivity claim is increasingly being repeated
in legal and economic scholarship and in the media.
The monopoly regressivity claim may have considerable
political appeal, but it is vastly overstated. Although there are
surely some violations of the antitrust laws that exacerbate
wealth inequality, the generalization that more antitrust enforcement would lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth
misunderstands the actual incidence and effects of antitrust
enforcement. Exercises of market power have complex, crosscutting effects, some of which may be regressive, but many of
which may also be progressive or distributively neutral. More
antitrust is not the answer to wealth inequality.
Daniel A. Crane is associate dean for faculty and research at the University of
Michigan Law School.

The Monopoly Regressivity Claim

There are many good reasons to favor competitive markets,
and to think that some degree of antitrust enforcement is
necessary to produce such markets. Competitive markets result
in innovation, lower prices, and expanded output. This is all
good and healthy, but it does not necessarily result in greater
income equality. Suppose a more competitive economy results
in a 20 percent increase in gross domestic product, with all
members of society benefiting, but the wealthiest stratum
obtains a greater per-capita share of the wealth than the lower
strata. In that case, competition would have resulted in growth
and gains for everyone, even while it would have increased
wealth inequality. More competition does not inherently lead
to greater equality.
Indeed, many of the social welfare policy interventions favored
by progressives are designed to mitigate the inequality-inducing
effects of competitive markets. Minimum wage laws require employees to be compensated based on some measure of merit or need
rather than the value of their marginal contributions as ascertained in competitive labor markets. Unions had to be exempted
from the operation of the antitrust laws because they replaced
labor competition with labor cartelization. The entire social
welfare state is built on the premise that competitive markets
produce socially undesirable outcomes.
So where does the monopoly regressivity claim come from?
In the developing world, the claim can frequently be heard from
proponents of market liberalization. Such groups as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World
Trade Organization argue that the introduction of competition
law increases the welfare of the poor. And indeed this story
rings true in markets where productive assets are closely held
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as product market competition softens. Indeed, some empirical
studies show the opposite—that CEO compensation declines in
less competitive markets. The intuition explaining this effect
is that CEO talent may be less valuable to the corporation in a
monopoly market, where earning high profits may be easier than
in a more competitive market.
What about shareholders? Certainly, shareholders capture
some gains from monopoly rents, but that does not necessarily make antitrust violations regressive. Shareholding is widely
distributed in the United States, with 88 million participants in
401(k) or similar retirement plans and pensions controlling 16
percent of domestic corporate equities. So,
directly or indirectly, many middle-class
interests are represented among the ranks
of shareholders.
Proponents of the monopoly regressivity theory point to studies showing that
shareholding is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of the very wealthy.
But do shareholders reap a significant portion of the monopoly rents generated by
the corporation? While they surely obtain
some of the rents, it is far from clear that
they reap the lion’s share.
It has long been understood that various interests within the
firm and outside its borders compete to appropriate any monopoly rents generated by the corporation. Monopoly profits often
do not show up on corporate balance sheets (where they would
benefit shareholders) because they are eaten up within the firm. A
standard trope in antitrust law concerns the fat, lazy monopolist
internally consuming its monopoly profits through sloth and lack
of incentive. As Judge Learned Hand famously remarked in his
landmark Alcoa decision, “Many people believe that possession
of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages
thrift, and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is
a narcotic.” Or, as Nobel laureate John Hicks remarked, “The best
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”
Workers are one of the groups well documented to benefit
from monopoly power. Empirical studies have shown a monopoly
wage premium for both unionized and non-unionized workers
across a wide range of industries, and also the tendency for unionization to increase with increases in employer market power. Blue
collar workers are thus able to appropriate some of the monopoly
rents generated by their employers.
Consistent with this economic literature, labor unions and
other progressive-leaning groups have sometimes supported
large corporate mergers that raised serious antitrust questions.
The Communications Workers of America supported the AT&T–
T-Mobile merger that was eventually blocked by the U.S. Justice
Department and Federal Communications Commission, and
three airline employee unions supported the controversial (and
now widely derided) merger of American Airlines and USAir.

Prominent civil rights organizations have supported such corporate mergers as Comcast–NBC and SIRIUS–XM. Whether or
not those mergers should have been blocked as anticompetitive,
many organizations ostensibly representing the interests of workers, minorities, and other arguably disadvantaged groups saw
benefits to their constituencies.
A final straw for the claim that shareholders and CEOs are
the chief beneficiaries of anticompetitive behavior arises from
the fact that antitrust law applies to non-corporate actors as
much as to corporate ones. Many of the “producers” whose
commercial agreements have been challenged by antitrust

Studies have shown a monopoly wage premium for both
unionized and non-unionized workers across a wide
range of industries, and also the tendency for unionization to increase with increases in employer market power.

authorities are not corporate at all, but rather sole proprietors
or middle-class professionals. For example, in 2014 the Federal
Trade Commission brought an enforcement action against an
association of music teachers over an association rule prohibiting teachers from soliciting clients from rival teachers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, music teachers earn
a squarely middle-class annual income of $66,000. In the last
two years, the FTC also brought enforcement actions against
other middle-class professions, including property managers,
legal support professionals, lighting and sign managers, and
ice skating coaches.
Another case against middle-class professionals, this one
brought by the Justice Department, showcases the potential for
antitrust enforcement to have regressive rather than progressive
wealth distribution effects. In 2005, the Justice Department
brought an antitrust challenge against the National Association
of Realtors based on restrictions on the ability of home buyers to
search for real estate listings over the Internet. According to the
Justice Department, the effect of this restriction was to inflate realtor commissions. If that allegation was true, then the enforcement
action likely had highly regressive effects. The median income of
realtors is $41,990, and that of home sellers (who typically pay
commissions) is $97,500. Any rent extraction by realtors would be
progressive. Further, given the magnitude of existing home sales
($1.2 trillion annually), the magnitude of this progressive effect
(and, conversely, the regressive effect of antitrust enforcement)
could be measured in the billions of dollars.
To be clear, my point is not to condemn the Justice Department’s enforcement action for its regressivity. Rather, it is to point

